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HIRING OF ATTORNEY TO REPRESENT THIRD
PARTIES-THE UMBRELLA DEFENSE

The federal courts recently have examined the scope of the
attorney-client privilege in the context of the use of an attorney in
"umbrella defense" operations. The "umbrella defense" refers to a
system whereby major conspiratorial figures supply bond money and
legal services to their apprehended "mules" in order to impede or
prevent disclosure of the larger conspiracy.' In a typical problem setting, an attorney retained by an unidentified central conspiratorial
figure enters an appearance as counsel, posts release bonds, and
represents suspects charged with conspiracy to distribute narcotics.
The suspects usually are unacquainted with the attorney and have
no knowledge of the identity of the anonymous third-party hirer. The
benefactor may provide the legal services and release bonds in fulfillment of an underlying promise (made at the commencement of the
conspiracy) to provide such services to coconspirators arrested in the
course of the conspiracy. The attorney, who may wish to prevent
disclosure of "Mr. Anonymous" (and perhaps other conspiratorial
figures), refuses to reveal the identity of the anonymous figure to
either the suspects or the grand jury investigating the conspiracy,
claiming the unknown benefactor is his "client" and invoking the
attorney-client privilege. In several cases, the suspects have been
granted use immunity and have waived the attorney-client privilege;'
thus the attorney's failure to disclose the benefactor's identity denies
the suspects the benefit of this valuable information in plea bargaining negotiations and prevents grand jury investigation into the larger
conspiracy.
In In re Grand Jury Proceedings (In re Pavlick),3 the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals recently addressed the issue of whether the attorneyclient privilege protects the secrecy of the third-party benefactor's
identity in an alleged umbrella defense system. The court, on rehearing en banc, was seriously divided regarding the appropriate legal
principles to be used to resolve the issue. A majority of the twelve
judges sitting agreed as to result only, requiring disclosure under the
circumstances of the case. The plurality opinion by Judge Gee, joined
Copyright 1983, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. See Brief for the United States at 20 (original hearing) & 10-11 (petition for
rehearing), In re Grand Jury Proceedings [hereinafter referred to as In re Pavlick],
680 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1982).
2. See In re Pavlick, 680 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Hodge &
Zweig, 548 F2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1977); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 517 F.2d 666 (5th
Cir. 1975); see also In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 600 F.2d 215 (9th Cir. 1979); In re
Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated Apr. 19, 1978, 451 F. Supp. 969 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); People
ex rel. Vogelstein v. Warden of County Jail, 150 Misc. 714, 270 N.Y.S. 362 (Sup. Ct.
1934); Ex parte McDonough, 170 Cal. 230, 149 P. 566 (1915).
3. 680 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1982).
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in by four other judges, gave great weight to testimony by one of
the suspects that, at the outset of his involvement in the drug conspiracy, he had been promised that he would be "taken care of" if
arrested." The plurality found that the suspect's testimony that legal
services were promised as consideration for joining the conspiracy
constituted a "prima facie" showing "that an integral part of the conspiracy was the agreement by participants to furnish bail and legal
expenses for conspirators who were apprehended."5 Accordingly, since
a prima facie showing was made that the attorney was hired in furtherance of the illegal conspiracy, 6 the "crime-fraud" exception to the
attorney-client privilege dissolved any privilege shielding the benefactor's identity. 7
As an alternate rationale, the plurality strongly implied that a
client's identity was not privileged unless disclosure of that identity
supplied the "last link in an existing chain of incriminating evidence
likely to lead to the client's indictment."8' Finding no such conclusive
inculpatory link under the facts, the plurality concluded that the
benefactor's identity was not protected under the exceptional privilege
for client identity established by the court in prior cases.' Given the
plurality's primary reliance upon the crime-fraud release to resolve
the umbrella defense problem,'" the import of the identity reasoning
4. Id. at 1028.
5. Id. (quoting United States v. Hodge & Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347, 1354-55 (9th Cir.
1977)).
6. See United States v. Hodge & Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347, 1354 (9th Cir. 1977) (in
"furtherance of intended, or present, continuing illegality"). See also C. McCoRMICK,
MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE S 95 at 199 (2d. ed. 1972), and
authorities collected therein.
7. 680 F.2d at 1028. Six of the twelve judges sitting en bane in Pavlick backed
the application of the crime-fraud exception to dissolve any privilege shielding the
benefactor's identity.
8. Id. at 1027; see id. at 1027 n.2.
9. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings [hereinafter referred to as In re Grand
Jury Proceedings (United States v. Jones)], 517 F.2d 666 (5th Cir. 1975). The plurality
in Pavlick characterized Jones as recognizing a "limited and narrow exception" to the
rule of disclosure of client identity where such disclosure would supply the "last link"
in a chain of incriminating evidence. Since identity was found not to be the "last link"
in a chain of evidence in Pavlick, "this and other features distinguished Jones from
the instant case." 680 F.2d at 1027.
Judge Politz, in dissent, stated.that the plurality's "last link" language misstates
the Jones test for the exceptional extension of the attorney-client privilege to protect
the client's identity. Id. at 1032-33. In Jones, the court stated that the identity of a
client "should also be protected when so much of the substance of the communications
is already in the government's possession that additional disclosures would yield substantially probative links in an existing chain of inculpatory events or transactions." 517
F.2d at 674. The Jones standard would protect client identity where it is "substantially" incriminating, whereas the Pavlick plurality's language would narrow the identity
privilege to shield client identity only where it is conclusively incriminating.
10. The prima facie showing of an underlying legal services agreement was the
"critical distinction" compelling disclosure in Pavlick. 680 F.2d at 1028.
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as a basis for the decision is unclear.1"
The plurality's client identity reasoning implicitly rests upon the
major assumption that an attorney-client relationship and privilege
exists between the benefactor and the attorney in umbrella defense
operations. However, several umbrella defense cases have either
avoided or not recognized these issues." The courts instead proceeded
to discuss the scope of privilege as between the benefactor and the
attorney in the particular case; i.e., whether the benefactor's identity
was privileged. This note will address the propriety of applying the
crime-fraud release to the attorney-client relationships involved in the
umbrella defense and will discuss the primary issue of whether an
attorney-client privilege exists between the benefactor and the attorney. The client identity issue is thus generally beyond the scope
of this note. Perhaps, the Pavlick plurality's narrow construction of
the client identity privilege was unnecessary. Approaches more closely
tailored to resolving the specific problem of use of the privilege to
protect the umbrella defense may exist.
Matters such as client identity and fee payments traditionally have
been considered "underlying facts" of the relationship, rather than
"communications," and are thus generally unprivileged."1 However, the
modern narrow privilege as to client identity is founded upon recognition that often the identity of a client possesses communicative
significance, as where the hiring of an attorney acts as an acknowledgement of guilt or reveals the "underlying motive of the litigation.""'
In these cases, identity becomes in effect a communication, which
should fall within the communications privilege in the absence of
factors dissolving the privilege in the particular case." For purposes
of this discussion, client identity will be treated as a communication
between client and attorney. Clearly, if a particular communication
11. The lack of conclusive inculpatory significance as concerned client identity
was "one feature" supporting disclosure of the benefactor's identity in Pavlick. Id.
at 1027.
12. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 600 F.2d 215, 218 n.1 (9th Cir. 1979); In
re Grand Jury Proceedings (United States v. Jones), 517 F.2d 666, 675 (5th Cir. 1975);
United States v. Pape, 144 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1944); United States v. Lee, 107 F. 702
(E.D.N.Y. 1901); Ex parte McDonough, 170 Cal. 230, 149 P. 566 (1915); State v. Toscano,
13 N.J. 418, 100 A.2d 170 (1953).
13. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 6, S 90 at 185; Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623,
626-27 (9th Cir. 1960); see also Tillotson v. Boughner, 350 F.2d 663 (7th Cir. 1965); In
re Kozlov, 79 N.J. 232, 398 A.2d 882 (1979); In re Kaplan, 8 N.Y.2d 214, 168 N.E. 2d
660, 203 N.Y.S.2d 836 (1960); Zwerling, Federal Grand Juries v. Attorney Independence
and the Attorney-Client Privilege, 27 HASTINGS L. REV. 1263, '1282 (1976); Comment,
Assertion of the Attorney-Client Privilege to Protect the Client's Identity, 28 U. CHI. L.
REV. 533 (1961); Annot., 16 A.L.R.3d 1047 (1967).
14. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW S 2313 at 609 (McNaughton
ed. 1961).
15. See Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623, 626-27 (9th Cir. 1960).
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is unprotected, by virtue of the crime-fraud release or an absence of
privilege, the identity of the communicator should be unprivileged as
well.
Crime-Fraud Release
According to Wigmore, the "policies of confidentiality" underlying
the attorney-client privilege (free disclosure by the client in his pursuit of legal advice) "cease to operate ...where the desired advice
8
refers not to prior wrongdoing, but to future wrongdoing."'
Authorities agree that the attorney-client privilege extends only to
consultation with respect to past, completed criminal or fraudulent
acts. The privilege is vitiated where the client seeks legal advice or
makes a communication for the purpose of furthering present, continuing, or future illegality. 7 The policies supporting this "crime-fraud
release" include the safeguarding of the integrity of the privilege and
the professional relationship and the prevention of misuse of the
privilege as a "cloak or shield for the perpetration of a crime or
fraudulent wrongdoing."18
The crime-fraud release is "triggered" by the client's culpable
misuse of the attorney-client relationship. According to McCormick,
"if the privilege is to be denied on the ground of unlawful purpose,
the client's guilty intention is controlling, even though the attorney
may have acted innocently and in good faith."'9 Dissolution of the
privilege generally requires the establishment of at least a prima facie
case of abuse by the client.2'
In United States v. Hodge & Zweig," an IRS summons was issued
directing a lawyer to produce records of payments from both identified and unidentified clients for representation of both these clients
and third parties under investigation for conspiracy to import

16. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 14, S 2291 at 545, S 2298 at 573; see also id. S 2285
at 527.
17. E.g., C. MCCORMICK, supra note 6, 5 95 at 199, and authorities collected
therein; see also 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 14, 5 229 at 573 n.1; FED. R. EVID. 503(d)(1)
(unadopted), 56 F.R.D. 183, 236 (1972).
18. Securities & Exchange Comm'n v. Harrison, 80 F. Supp. 226, 230 (D.D.C. 1948);
see United States v. Hodge & Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347, 1354 (9th Cir. 1977); see also 8
J. WIGMORE, supra note 14, S 2299.
19. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 6, S 95 at 200; see 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 14,
S 2298 at 573, 577.
20. E.g., C. MCCORMICK, supra note 6, S 95 at 200; Clark v. United States, 289
U.S. 1 (1933) (involving privilege of a petit juror, not that of attorney-client); In re
Fine, 641 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1981).
21. 548 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1977). The plurality in Pavlick relied heavily upon this
case.
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narcotics.22 The narcotics conspiracy charge alleged as an element of
the conspiracy an agreement for the provision of bail and legal services for participants apprehended in the course of the conspiracy.
The identified client and the suspected third parties subsequently
pleaded guilty. The court rejected the attorney's claim of privilege
as to records of payments from the unidentified clients, finding the
guilty pleas to be a prima facie showing of the use of legal services
in the furtherance of a criminal conspiracy."
In light of the evidence in Hodge and Pavlick that the suspects
therein were privy to an underlying legal services agreement, arguably
a prima facie showing of the culpability of the attorney's "clients"
(both the benefactor and the suspects) was made sufficient to support
the application of the crime-fraud release. The attorney's ignorance
or knowledge of the underlying agreement would seem irrelevant,
since the release is controlled by the client's conspiratorial intent.
Arguably, such an agreement would itself constitute an element of
the criminal conspiracy, given that the legal services agreement encourages criminal acts by coconspirators.24 Thus, this "legal insurance
contract" would constitute "continuing" or "present or intended illegal
activity."25
Concurring and dissenting opinions in Pavlick attempted to
distinguish that case from Hodge by referring to evidence in Hodge
22. The summons was part of an IRS investigation into the identified client's financial affairs, in connection with suspected tax fraud. Id. at 1351.
23. According to the court, the legal services agreement "was designed to hinder
any criminal drug prosecution arising out of the conspiracy." Id. at 1354-55. See In
re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated Apr. 19, 1978, 451 F. Supp. 969, 972-73 (E.D.N.Y. 1978);
see also In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 600 F.2d 215, 218-19 (9th Cir. 1979).
24. See MODEL PENAL CODE S 5.03 (Proposed Official Draft 1962):
Criminal Conspiracy. (1) ...A person is guilty of conspiracy with another person
or persons to commit a crime if with the purpose of promoting or facilitating
its commission he: ...(b) agrees to aid such other person or persons in the planning
or commission of such crime or of an attempt or 'solicitation to commit such crime.
An agreement which amounts to a legal insurance contract "aids" in the commission
of the criminal acts which are covered by the "insurance." The government, in Pavlick,
argued in its brief:
It is not unusual in drug conspiracies for one conspirator to promise a cash payment, over and above any other agreed payment, to other co-conspirators for
maintenance of their homes and families if the co-conspirators are ever incarcerated
due to their activity in the conspiracy. Is not the subsequent paying of that cash
fee an act in furtherance of the conspiracy? If so, is there any difference between
that payment and the payment of legal fees in the instant case?
Brief for the the United States at 8-9 (petition for rehearing en banc). See In re Grand
Jury Proceedings, 600 F.2d 215, 218-19 (9th Cir. 1979), in which the court's reasoning
implies that such an agreement would itself be punishable as an element of the narcotics conspiracy. See also United States v. Hodge & Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347, 1354 (9th
Cir. 1977); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 451 F. Supp. 969, 972 (E.D.N.Y. 1978),
25. Hodge, 548 F.2d at 1354.
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that the legal services therein were secured while criminal acts (smuggling) within the scope of the larger conspiracy were continuing. 6 In
Pavlick, by contrast, there was no evidence of continuing acts within
a larger conspiracy at the time the attorney was hired. Since the attorney was hired only with reference to past acts of smuggling, "[t]here
[was] no indication that the legal representation was secured in furtherance of 'intended, or present, continuing illegality.' "' Rather, the
attorney in Pavlick was "retained to represent the three defendants
and the unidentified client for past, [completed] criminal acts."28 Thus,
according to this reasoning, the crime-fraud release should not have
applied.
The reluctance to find the very act of securing legal services to
constitute "present, continuing illegality" is understandable, in view
of the desirability of maintaining a clear distinction between representation as to past completed acts and representation as to continuing
illegality. However, substantive conspiracy principles support a finding of "present" illegality in the very act of hiring the attorney, when
done in fulfillment of a conspiratorial agreement, and thus the application of the crime-fraud release in Hodge and Pavlick appears
sound.' Conspiracy is "heavily mental in composition,"' and apparently
innocent acts become criminal when the underlying conspiratorial
agreement is revealed. Given the allegedly conspiratorial motive
behind the benefactor's acts, the hiring of the attorney is a "present"
criminal act independent of any ongoing smuggling operations within
a larger conspiracy. Thus, the crime-fraud rationale should apply even
though all smuggling operations (or, indeed, the larger conspiracy in
its entirety) have ceased.
Furthermore, the policies underlying the crime-fraud rationale support its application in this conspiracy context. As suggested by
Wigmore, public confidence in the legal profession is threatened when
the attorney is "the link without whose testimony the conspiracy or
some part of its development cannot be evidenced." 1 Fulfillment of
the legal services agreement gives that agreement "value" and
encourages further conspiratorial activities by other recipients of
similar promises.2 Arguably, central conspiratorial figures should not
be permitted to receive this benefit while hiding their activities behind
the attorney-client privilege.
26.
27.
28.
29.

680 F.2d at 1030 n.4 (Rubin, J., concurring) & 1033 (Politz, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1030.
Id. at 1033.
See supra note 24 and accompanying text.

30.

Harno, Intent in Criminal Conspiracy, 89 U. PA. L. REv. 624, 632 (1941), cited

in LA. R.S. 14:26, comment (1950 & Supp. 1977).
31. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 14, S 2299 at 578.
32. See In re Pavlick, 680 F.2d at 1028.
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A problem concerning the appropriate scope of the crime-fraud
solution arises when it is applied to various "legitimate" employeremployee relationships where it is expected or implied that the
employee will receive legal aid (perhaps by a corporation's house
counsel) provided by the employer should the employee incur personal
legal liability during the course of employment.' It would appear inappropriate to extend the crime-fraud rationale to cases in which the
underlying legal services agreement furthers or encourages activities
by an employee that are not known to be criminal at the time of the
agreement. Such an approach would burden an employer's legitimate
interest in protecting good faith employees from legal liability incurred
incident to performance of corporate duties.
The appropriate scope of the plurality's crime-fraud approach is
suggested by the original common law doctrine that "specific intent"an intent to bring about a result that is known to be criminal or "is
so obviously antisocial in character" that it should be known to be
criminal-'is a necessary element of conspiracy. "Thus it is a defense
that the defendants were in ignorance of the fact that the act they
were planning was a crime, for in such case, there could be no 'corrupt motive.' "5 The "specific intent" requirement in criminal conspiracy cases has fallen into disrepute in several jurisdictions, and
its present general authority is uncertain.3" Nonetheless, mistake of
law, i.e., a lack of knowledge of the criminality of the acts induced
by the legal services agreement, should be a "defense" to application
of the crime-fraud release in these cases. Such a limitation upon the
application of the crime-fraud release would prevent encroachment
upon "legitimate" employer-employee relationships. Furthermore, rejecting the crime-fraud rationale in the absence of knowing criminality comports nicely with the crime-fraud doctrine's emphasis upon the
culpability of the client as the "triggering" mechanism. In cases in
which intended activities are not clearly legal or illegal, application
33. In Pavlick, Judge Rubin, in concurrence, suggested a situation in which a corporate officer, indicted as a codefendant with the corporation in an antitrust prosecution, reveals an underlying agreement or understanding, either express or implied,
that the corporation would provide house counsel to represent the officer. Judge Rubin
cautioned: "I would intimate no opinion concerning the effect of this agreement, which
might be viewed as a fringe benefit for use in recruiting or continuing the services
of a criminal conspirator." Id. at 1030 n.3.
34. See LA. R.S. 14:26, comments (1950 & Supp. 1977); see also People v. Powell,
63 N.Y. 88 (1875); W. LAFAVE, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 461-62 (1978) (citing MODEL
PENAL CODE S 5.03 comments at 113-16 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960)).
35. LA. R.S. 14:26, comment (citing Commonwealth v. Benesch, 290 Mass. 125, 194
N.E. 905 (1935)).
36. E.g., People v. McLaughlin, 111 Cal. App. 2d 781, 245 P.2d 1076 (1952); People
326, 193 N.E. 150 (1934). See MODEL PENAL CODE S 5.03 comments
v. Cohn, 358 Ill.
at 114-16 (Tent. Draft. No. 10, 1960); see also LA. R.S. 14:26, comments.
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of the crime-fraud release again would hinge upon the "corrupt motive"
of the client, i.e., the degree to which a planned course of activity
should have been known to be criminal or was in fact known to be
criminal.
In Pavlick, the plurality stated, with reference to dissolving the
attorney-client privilege on the basis of a conspiratorial legal services
agreement:
Such an agreement, of course, need only be an effective one, need
not be express, and might in a proper case be found to arise even
from a custom or a prior course of conduct toward other apprehendees. Our case is an easy one, the agreement being express
and Mr. Pavlick's services having rather clearly been furnished
in redemption of it.'
The plurality's speculation that a conspiratorial agreement could be
implied from a consistent course of conduct seems proper, but it should
be emphasized that the.requisite client culpability hinges upon finding at least a subjectively shared understanding between "mules" and
benefactor as to "legal insurance," such agreement furnishing an inducement or consideration for conspiratorial acts.
The crime-fraud release is triggered by the fraudulent purpose
for which an attorney is hired or for which particular communications
are made to the attorney. Only those communications made in furtherance of the hirer's criminal scheme (i.e., those communications
made for the purpose of securing legal assistance for third persons,
in fulfillment of a legal services promise) are unprotected. In a particular case, the attorney may have been hired in part to advise the
benefactor as to the benefactor's own culpability. The crime-fraud rationale is sufficiently narrow to exclude communications between the
benefactor and the attorney made for the purpose of obtaining legal
advice for the benefactor. Arguably, such advice would not have been
sought for the purpose of pursuing an underlying conspiratorial agreement, but rather for the purpose of obtaining advice with reference
to past acts of the benefactor. The key to delimiting the scope of the
crime-fraud exception is to determine the purpose for which a particular communication was made and whether that purpose was
"legitimate" or "illegitimate."38
Arguably, a crime-fraud approach, when based solely upon the
presence of an underlying legal services agreement, is too costly to
37. 680 F.2d at 1029.
38. See In re Pavlick, 680 F.2d at 1030 (Garwood, J., concurring). Further discussion of the importance of discerning the purpose of a particular communication in defining
the boundaries of the attorney-client privilege will follow in connection with the evaluation of Judge Rubin's finding of an absence of privilege as to communications concerning representation of third parties. See infra notes 47-65 and accompanying text.
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the attorney-client relationships involved in umbrella defense cases.3 9
The crime-fraud release would compel disclosure not only of the
benefactor's identity but of all communications between attorney and
benefactor made for the purpose of securing legal services for the
apprehended suspects."0 In fact, given that the suspects are principals
to the underlying legal services agreement, one could contend that
the crime-fraud rationale should apply to all communications between
the attorney and the suspects made for purposes of obtaining legal
advice for the suspects. The courts must recognize the full implications of this rationale; in practice, the entire relationship would be
so "tainted" that the suspects would be compelled to refuse the
assistance of the "tainted" attorney and seek legal assistance elsewhere
in order to enjoy a privileged attorney-client relationship. It is submitted that the courts should carefully balance the policy of promoting
confidentiality essential to the functioning of socially desired relationships against the compelling need for access to relevant evidence
before they burden the suspects with such onerous consequences. Indeed, in the interest of breaking the conspiracy, the balance may tilt
in favor of full disclosure as respects all parties. The use of the "legal
insurance" contract in the umbrella defense system would be
discouraged if both benefactor and "mules" were denied a confidential relationship with the tainted attorney.
The crime-fraud approach potentially is quite costly to all the
attorney-client relationships involved in umbrella defense cases.
Arguably, it should be applied sparingly, only in cases of "illegitimate"
relationships in which the anonymous hirer and the recipients of the
legal services share "corrupt" or conspiratorial motives. Presumably,
the crime-fraud solution would apply only where a prima facie showing is made that legal services were provided pursuant to an agreement which was itself punishable as an element of the conspiracy.
Absent evidence of such an agreement, arguably, the attorney was
hired (whether by a third person benefactor or by the suspected client

39. See In re Pavlick, 680 F.2d at 1033 (Politz, J., dissenting). Judge Rubin, in
concurrence, would have avoided the crime-fraud reasoning as unnecessary to the
disposition of the case. However, he did question the applicability of the crime-fraud
rationale where the attorney was hired with reference to past, completed acts of smuggling and indicated the crime-fraud approach might be too costly as applied in other
umbrella defense cases. I. at 1030.
40. See In re Pavlick, 680 F.2d at 1030 (Rubin, J., concurring), 1033 (Politz, J.,
dissenting). Assuming that the use of an attorney in umbrella defense cases is
undesirable, the disclosure of all communications made for the purpose of the "umbrella" use would not seem objectionable. Indeed, the narrower approach of finding
an absence of relationship or privilege between the benefactor and the attorney for
purposes of hiring the attorney to represent third parties also would result in disclosure
of communications as well as identity.
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himself) only for representation as to past completed acts and the
crime-fraud release should not apply."'
Privilege Between Attorney and Anonymous Hirer
In umbrella defense cases lacking evidence of a conspiratorial legal
services agreement, disclosure of the anonymous hirer's identity is
perhaps compellable upon a narrower legal basis, namely, an absence
of privilege as to communications made for purposes of legal representation of third parties.42 The hirer's identity thus may be unprotected,
41. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 600 F.2d 215 (9th Cir. 1979), an umbrella
defense case involving facts substantially similar to Pavlick and Hodge, where the court
found that, absent a prima facie showing that legal services were provided pursuant
to a conspiratorial agreement, the crime-fraud release should not apply. Id. at 218-19.
But see People ex rel. Vogelstein v. Warden of County Jail, 150 Misc. 714, 270 N.Y.S.
362 (Sup. Ct. 1934) (gambling scheme investigation). In Vogelstein, an attorney was
hired by an unidentified codefendant who had not pleaded guilty to represent several
other defendants. Some of these other defendants had pleaded guilty, had waived the
attorney-client privilege, and had testified that they did not know the attorney and
had not retained him or paid his fees. The court, although not expressly finding an
underlying legal services agreement, rejected the attorney's claim of privilege as to
his hirer's identity on several grounds, including the crime-fraud rationale:
What has taken place here ... certainly lends color to the charge that the relator
was retained in furtherance of an unlawful scheme for wholesale violations of
the law. That the relator himself may have been in ignorance of this unlawful
purpose, and the dupe of his employer, is certainly no reason for refusing to break
the seal of secrecy.
150 Misc. at 721, 270 N.Y.S. at 371.
See also In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated Apr. 19, 1978, 451 F. Supp. 969, 972-73
(E.D.N.Y. 1978), a case involving facts substantially similar to Hodge and Pavick, although
the court did not expressly recognize an underlying legal services agreement. As an
alternate rationale for requiring disclosure of the hirer's identity, the court stated:
Furthermore, the government has submitted to the court an affidavit .... strongly indicating that the movant's law firm was retained pursuant to an ongoing
criminal enterprise to distribute narcotics and that the firm was retained in an
effort to conceal the conspiracy, to obstruct justice . . . . These are the very
activities being investigated by the grand jury .... [Tihe attorney-client privilege
does not apply where legal representation was secured in furtherance of intended, or present, continuing illegality .... "even where the attorney is completely
unaware that his advice is sought in furtherance of such an improper purpose."
451 F. Supp. at 972.
The above courts' discussion of the crime-fraud release, even absent evidence of
a legal services agreement, may imply that hiring an attorney to represent third parties, with the purpose of impeding investigation into the larger conspiracy, itself would
amount to obstruction of justice and thus "present," "continuing" illegality. Perhaps,
this use of an attorney would constitute interference "with the administration of justice
in a civil or criminal proceeding." F. WHARTON, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW § 723 at
529 (14th ed. 1981).
42. In Pavlick, Judges Rubin's and Garwood's concurrences suggest this narrower
and perhaps less costly approach to subverting the umbrella defense. 680 F.2d at 1029
& 1030.
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even in noncriminal or "legitimate" third-party representation cases.
However, this narrower approach should not impinge upon the
privilege as between the attorney and the suspects who receive the
legal services."
Authorities agree that the burden of establishing the existence
of the attorney-client relationship and the prerequisites of the privilege
rests upon the claimant of the privilege." As such, the claimant must
establish that
(1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become
a client; (2) the person to whom the communication was made
...
is acting as a lawyer [in connection with the communication];
(3) the communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was
informed . . . for the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an
opinion on law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal
proceeding.5
As the above formula indicates, the boundaries of the attorneyclient privilege (a communications privilege, not a testimonial
privilege)" are defined by examining the purpose for which a particular
communication was made. Under the strict Wigmore formula, only
those communications made "for the purpose of securing primarily
either an opinion on law or legal services or assistance in some legal
proceeding"47 are protected by the privilege. Furthermore, the communications privilege appears to be designed to protect only those
communications of a client made for the purpose of securing personal
legal advice or assistance, i.e., service or assistance for the benefit
of the hiring client. 48
43. See text at notes 57-58, infra.
44. E.g., United States v. Kelly, 569 F.2d 928 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 829
(1978); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated Apr. 19, 1978, 451 F. Supp. 969 (E.D.N.Y.
1978); C. MCCORMICK, supra note 6, S 88 at 179.
45. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (United States v. Jones), 517 F.2d 666, 670 (5th
Cir. 1975) (quoting United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59
(D. Mass. 1950)). See United States v. Ponder, 475 F.2d 37, 39 (5th Cir. 1973); C. McCoRMICK, supra note 6, 55 87-88 at 175-82; 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 14, 5 2292 at 554.
46. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 6, 5 92 at 192.
47. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (United States v. Jones), 517 F.2d 666, 670 (5th
Cir. 1975).
48. E.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 451 F. Supp. 969, 971 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); FED.
R. EVID. 503(b) (unadopted), 56 F.R.D. 183, 236 (1972) ("A client has a privilege to
refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal
services to the client.") (emphasis added); FED. R. EVID. 503(b) (unadopted), advisory
committee note, 56 F.R.D. at 239 ("all these communications must be specifically for
the purpose of obtaining legal services for the client; otherwise the privilege does
not attach"); see FED. R. EVID. 503(a)(1) (unadopted), 56 F.R.D. at 235 ("A 'client' is
a person . .. who is rendered professional legal services by a lawyer, or who consults
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In Pavlick, Judge Rubin, in concurrence, argued that the attorneyclient privilege should not extend to communications between benefactor and attorney made for purposes of representation or bond payment for third persons. Since the benefactor is not a "client" for these
purposes, the benefactor's identity is not privileged, even though the
benefactor also may retain the attorney for representation with respect
to his own culpability. 9
Of course, a coconspirator in a position of "contingent liability"
benefits from legal assistance rendered to third-party coconspirators,
and thus hiring an attorney to represent coconspirators may be in
the pursuit of "an opinion on law or legal services or assistance in
some legal proceeding"
for the benefit of the hirer or in the hirer's
"own" cause. ° But the assistance so given to the third parties is not
given "to" the benefactor- another attorney might have been hired
to represent the benefactor as to his own culpability. Thus, arguably,
the "benefit" received by the benefactor from the representation of
third parties is merely an indirect benefit that any conspirator receives
from legal assistance given to his coconspirators. The prevailing rule
of construction as concerns the attorney-client privilege is that of
"strictly confining" the privilege "within the narrowest possible limits
consistent with the logic of its principle.""1 The presumption remains
in favor of full access to all relevant evidence.2 The courts would do
little or no violence to the fundamental policy supporting the communications privilege-the promotion of free disclosure by the client
in his pursuit of legal advice or assistance-by refusing to expand
the privilege to encompass communications made for the purpose of
securing legal assistance for third parties.
Abuses characteristic of the umbrella defense system justify a
strict application of the Wigmore formula to curtail the privilege as
a lawyer with a view to obtaining professional legal services from him."); see also
Saltzburg, Communications Falling Within the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 IOWA L.
REV. 811, 812 (1981).
49. 680 F.2d at 1029.
50. See United States v. Pape, 144 F.2d 778, 783 (2d Cir. 1944) (Learned Hand,
J., dissenting). In Pape, a man retained an attorney to represent both himself and
a female alleged to be his coconspirator in a violation of the Mann Act. Judge Hand,
in dissent, emphasized the advantage received by the benefactor from legal representation of his alleged coconspirator and found the third-party representation to be "a
step in [the benefactor's] own defense." Communications between the benefactor and
the attorney concerning representation of the woman thus fell within the privilege.
Judge Hand stated "That direction to his own attorney in his own interest was as
much a privileged communication as any direction would have been, made in the course
of preparing for a trial; as much, for example, as to tell one's attorney to interview
a witness." Id. at 783.
51. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 14, S 2292 at 554.
52. Id.
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between benefactor and attorney. In umbrella defense situations, the
attorney's interest in preventing disclosure of the major figure may
conflict with his duty to represent zealously the apprehended suspects,
raising abuses typical in the context of an attorney's multiple representation of witnesses or defendants whose interests may conflict." For
example, the apprehended suspects often may desire to know who
hired the attorney making the appearance for them, as such information can enhance the suspects' value to the grand jury as an information source, thereby increasing the suspects' power to extract a
favorable plea bargain or immunity. In Pavlick and in prior "umbrella
defense" cases involving similar facts, however, the attorney refused
to reveal to the "mules" the identity of the anonymous hirer. 4 A
"mule" possessing information about the conspiracy likely would be
discouraged or prevented by the lawyer from exploiting this information in plea bargaining negotiations. 5" Indeed, the attorney's refusal
53. . For example, in multiple representation situations, privileged information received
from one witness might be useful to exculpate a co-witness or to otherwise aid
him (for example, in negotiating with the government for immunity in exchange for
testimony), but disclosure or other use of the information is precluded by the attorney's
confidential relationship with the disclosing witness. Many other problems arise which
result in direct interference with effective assistance of counsel to each witness. See
generally In re Gopman, 531 F.2d 262, 266 (5th Cir. 1976) (attorney acted on behalf
of a union and three of its officials in a grand jury investigation into location of union
records; union desired disclosure of the records, while witnesses desired to prevent
their own incrimination; court ordered disqualification of the attorney due to conflict
of interest); In re Investigation Before the Apr. 1975 Grand Jury, 403 F. Supp. 1176,
1180-82 (D.D.C. 1975), vacated per curiam, 531 F.2d 600 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Cole, Time
for a Change: Multiple Representation Should be Stopped, 2 NAT'L J. CRIM. DEF. 149
(1976). Says Cole, "To avoid the Scylla of conflict, the defense attorney with multiple
clients will likely become engulfed in the Charybdis of ineffective assistance of counsel."
Id. at 155.
54. In re Pavlick, 663 F.2d 1057 (5th Cir. 1981) (original hearing); see also In re
Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated Apr. 19, 1978, 451 F. Supp. 969 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
55. See Brief for the United States at 21 (original hearing) & 10-11 (petition for
rehearing), In re Pavlick, 680 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1982); Cole, supra note 53, at 154-55.
Other abuses include the possibility that the "mule" may desire to "come clean" with
the government by revealing conspiratorial figures but may fear redress from those
figures should they be informed of the mule's capitulation by the attorney. See Cole
supra note 53, at 154; Brief for the United States at 10-11 (petition for rehearing);
see also Ex parte McDonough, 170 Cal. 230, 247-49, 149 P. 566, 572-73 (1915) (Lawlor,
J., dissenting) (an excellent discussion of abuses of the umbrella defense, in the context of criminal conspiracy). Said Judge Lawlor, with reference to the umbrella operation involved,
the dual employment is disturbing, no matter from what angle it may be viewed,
and ... the law should frown upon the relation, for to sanction it is to ... place
a premium on unethical conduct . . . . No client in the suggested situation of
the petitioner's original "clients," is entitled to the services of an attorney for
the collateral purpose indicated here, and an attorney should not be permitted
to be so employed, and if he would guard his professional honor and standing
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to disclose the fee payor's identity, as well as other conflict of interest dilemmas created by the umbrella attorney's position, raises
serious ethical problems.56
Under certain circumstances, disqualification of the attorney remains an available remedy in serious conflict of interest situations.57
But the interest conflicts confronting the umbrella attorney threaten
the foundations of public confidence in and the professional integrity
of the attorney-client relationship. Given the abuses of the umbrella
defense system outlined above, disclosure should be favored where,
under a reasonable construction, the attorney-client privilege may be
found not to apply.
The conflict of interest problems raised by the umbrella defense
arise even absent an underlying legal services agreement or other
"illegal" use of the attorney's services. A finding of no privilege between benefactor and attorney as regards third-party representation
does not hinge upon a prima facie finding of an underlying legal services agreement. The "no privilege" approach is thus desirable in that
it avoids the above mentioned problems in all umbrella defense cases,
including those in which the crime-fraud approach should not apply.
Furthermore, a precise application of the Wigmore formula of
privileged communications approaches the specific problem of the umbrella defense without costly applications of the crime-fraud release.
Finding an absence of relationship or privilege as between the benefac. . . he would not be willing to be.
170 Cal. at 249, 149 P. at 573.
56. See, e.g., 663 F.2d 1057, 1059 n.1, where the Pavlick court, on original hearing,
noted with respect to the attorney's refusal to identify the benefactor to the suspects:
We note the inconsistency of the withholding of this information with the aspirational statement contained in Canon 2, E.C. 2-21 of the American Bar Association
Model Code of Professional Responsibility. "A lawyer shall not accept compensation or any thing of value incident to his employment or services from one other
than his client without the knowledge and consent of his client after full disclosure."
The Pavlick court also cited ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, Formal Op. 320

(1968). See

MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

EC 5-21 to 5-24 (1979). See

also ABA, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION
3.5(b) (The Defense Function) (1972):
Except for preliminary matters such as initial hearings or applications for bail,
a lawyer or lawyers who are associated in practice should not undertake to defend
more than one defendant in the same criminal case if the duty to one of the defendants may conflict with the duty to another. The potential for conflict of interest
in representing multiple defendants is so grave that ordinarily a lawyer should
decline to act for more than one of several co-defendants except in unusual situations when, after careful investigation, it is clear that no conflict is likely to develop,
and when the several defendants give an informed consent to such multiple
representation.
The ethical implications of the umbrella attorney's position generally are beyond the
scope of this note.
57. See, e.g., In re Gopman, 531 F.2d 262 (5th Cir. 1976); In re Investigation Before
the Apr. 1975 Grand Jury, 403 F. Supp. 1176 (D.D.C. 1975).
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tor and the attorney would in no way undermine the privilege as between the attorney and the third-party suspects to whom legal advice and representation are actually rendered.
Prior cases involving the hiring of an attorney to represent third
parties have not directly addressed the issue of whether a privilege
exists between the hirer and the attorney. The issue either was not
recognized or was considered waived by failure to argue the issue
in a timely fashion, and the courts proceeded to discuss the issue of
whether client identity fell within the privilege. 8 However, dicta in
a few cases supports the principle that a party who secures legal
assistance for third parties, without ever seeking advice or assistance
as to his own culpability, would neither be a "client" nor enjoy a confidential relationship, and thus no communications for purposes of
third-party representation would be privileged.' It is submitted that
a finding of no privilege as to communications concerning third-party
representation is proper even where the attorney is hired by the
benefactor in part to assist the benefactor as to his own culpability.
The communications privilege should protect only those communications made for the purpose of obtaining personal advice or assistance
for the communicating client. Communications made for purposes of
third-party representation (including the hirer's identity) should fall
outside of the communications privilege, even if the hirer is a "client"
for other purposes."
58. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 600 F.2d 215, 218 n.1 (9th Cir. 1979); In
re Grand Jury Proceedings (United States v. Jones), 517 F.2d 666, 675 (5th Cir. 1975);
United States v. Pape, 144 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1944); United States v. Lee, 107 F. 702
(E.D.N.Y 1901); Ex parte McDonough, 170 Cal. 230, 149 P. 566 (1915); State v. Toscano,
13 N.J. 418, 100 A.2d 170 (1953).
59. See United States v. Hodge & Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347, 1354 n.10 (9th Cir. 1977);
In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated Apr. 19, 1978, 451 F. Supp. 969, 971 (E.D.N.Y.
1978); see also United States v. Pape, 144 F.2d 778, 783 (2d Cir. 1944) (Learned Hand,
J., dissenting).
60. In Pavlick, Judge Rubin stated:
Even if the anonymous fee-payor sought personal legal advice from Mr. Pavlick
and became his client in regard to the matters about which he sought counsel,
he was not Mr. Pavlick's client in the matter for which the fee was paid and
about which Mr. Pavlick was interrogated ....
There is neither any contention
nor the slightest evidence that Mr. Pavlick was retained to represent Mr.
Anonymous jointly with these three. There was, therefore, no attorney-client relationship between the fee-payor and the lawyer with regard to the matter about
which Mr. Pavlick was questioned ....
Not only did Mr. Pavlick fail to establish
an attorney-client relationship with Mr. Anonymous in this matter, he also failed
to present evidence that the communication between him and Mr. Anonymous
concerning payment of a fee to represent Willis, Love and Peiser was for the
purpose of obtaining legal advice for Mr. Anonymous. As we have seen, the
attorney-client privilege shields only those communications made for the purpose
of securing such advice.
680 F.2d at 1029. But see United States v. Pape, 144 F.2d 778, 783 (2d Cir. 1944) (Learned
Hand, J., dissenting), summarized in note 50, supra.

1056

5LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 43

In Pavlick, a factual issue hotly contested on original hearing was
whether the attorney had met his burden of establishing the existence
of an attorney-client relationship between the benefactor and the attorney. The court, on original hearing, found on the basis of the attorney's ambiguous testimony that the benefactor had sought the attorney for personal legal assistance and was thus a "client who was
concerned about his own culpability.""1 The plurality, on rehearing,
assumed these facts "for the purposes of this opinion" 2 and then applied substantive privilege law, invoking the crime-fraud release and
finding client identity unprotected. The plurality may have adhered
to an assumption, possibly implicit in prior cases, that once the
benefactor has sought the attorney for personal advice, the privilege
should apply to all communications between the parties, including
those concerning third-party representation. Prior cases addressing
the umbrella defense noted or at least assumed, arguendo, that the
facts indicated that the benefactor had hired the attorney in part for
personal advice and thus had become the attorney's "client." 3 Perhaps
then assuming the privilege to be applicable to all communications
between the parties, the courts, in construing the scope of the privilege
as applied to third-party representation, applied substantive privilege
law, addressing client identity, crime-fraud, or other substantive
issues." However, the relevant issue in defining the scope of the communications privilege is not whether an attorney-client privilege exists
for any purpose, but whether a particular communication made during the existence of an attorney-client relationship falls within a protected purpose.
The above analysis assumes that the purpose of a particular communication between benefactor and attorney can be distinguished.
However, in cases of multiple representation where the attorney is
retained both to represent the benefactor personally and to represent the third-person apprehendees, the identification of a single purpose behind communications between the benefactor and the attorney
may not be possible. For example, the benefactor may reveal to the
attorney details concerning his involvement in the conspiracy, the
61. 663 F.2d at 1059-60.
62. 680 F.2d at 1027.
63. See United States v. Hodge & Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347, 1354 n.10 (9th Cir. 1977);
United States v. Pape, 144 F.2d 778, 783 (2d Cir. 1944) (Learned Hand, J., dissenting);
In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated Apr. 19, 1978, 451 F. Supp. 969, 971 (E.D.N.Y.
1978). Since these cases refused the privilege on substantive grounds, any inference
to be drawn from their assumption that the benefactor was a "client" is tenuous.
64. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 600 F.2d 215, 218 (9th Cir. 1979); See United
States v. Hodge & Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1977); In re Grand Jury Proceedings
(United States v. Jones), 517 F.2d 666, 675 (5th Cir. 1975); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas
Dated Apr. 19, 1978, 451 F. Supp. 969 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
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scope of the conspiracy, and other inculpatory information, intending
that the attorney use this information both in his representation of
the benefactor and in his representation of the third-party suspects.
In these cases, arguably, the communication bears two purposes, one
protected and the other unprotected. The attorney compelled by the
grand jury to disclose what the benefactor revealed when he retained
the attorney to represent third parties would simultaneously be
disclosing what the benefactor said to him for the protected purpose
of obtaining personal legal advice or assistance.
In the above hypothetical, a court might simply impose the burden
of disclosure upon the benefactor as a cost of using the attorney for
the questionable "third-party" purpose. In other words, given the
policy of strict construction of the privilege, the court would weigh
more heavily the unprotected purpose of the communication and compel disclosure on this basis. However, a court refusing to take this
step could arguably compel disclosure of at least the "fact" of the
retainer for third-party representation purposes, without encroaching
upon communications made in part for protected purposes. The
benefactor's identity in his capacity as a benefactor arguably relates
solely to the unprotected third-party representation purpose. Other
"underlying facts" of the attorney's umbrella function, such as the
amounts paid by the benefactor for legal fees and bond payments for
the suspects, also would seem related solely to this unprotected use
of the attorney. The benefactor's identity qua benefactor and other
facts related solely to the umbrella function of the attorney would
thus fall outside of the privilege. However, facts and communications
related to the hirer's retainer of the attorney for personal assistance
and advice would remain within the privilege. Thus the hirer's status
as a "client who is worried about his own culpability" 5 and those communications made wholly or partially for purposes of personal
assistance would remain within the privilege."6
Agency Principles
As respects the benefactor, the hiring of an attorney to represent third parties is analogous to the use of an attorney as an "agent,"
rather than as a legal advisor or representative. As indicated by the
abuses of the umbrella defense system, there is danger in expanding
65. In re Pavlick, 680 F.2d at 1030-31 (Garwood, J., concurring). In Pavlick, the
attorney volunteered the information that the benefactor was a "client" who was "worried about his own culpability." Id.
66. The hiring of an attorney to represent third parties is distinguishable from
other "multiple representation" situations, such as where several potential clients
simultaneously seek advice from an attorney. In these cases, where the multiple clients
participate jointly in retaining the attorney, disclosures by each client likely are made
solely for purposes of personal legal advice or assistance.
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the privilege to various "agency" relationships "while barring inquiry
into the ... relationship."67 The benefactor's "agent" may significantly interfere with the "mule's" right to effective assistance of counsel,
impede investigation into conspiratorial activities, and even encourage
further conspiratorial activities by others by honoring a "legal insurance" promise. The umbrella attorney will invoke the benefactorclient's privilege in order to shield the benefactor's identity and "insulate his activities from legal scrutiny." 8 The benefactor's activities
have significant, detrimental public impact beyond any attorney-client
relationship existing between the benefactor and the attorney.
Arguably, encroachment upon truth in the name of the privilege is
unwarranted when the privilege exacts this high social cost without
serving the policies justifying application of the privilege.
The courts have refused to extend the attorney-client privilege
to communications made for the purposes of retaining a lawyer for
"sundry nonlegal purposes." 9 This traditional restriction upon the communications privilege appears to acknowledge the dangers of the use
of the attorney as an "agent" and the propriety of restricting the
attorney-client privilege to communications made for purposes of personal advice or assistance. In these cases,
[tihe client seeks to have the lawyer perform an act as the client's
agent [rather than advisor] that would be subject to scrutiny by
courts if performed by other agents. In this type of case the
...[privilege] would tend to allow persons to engage in activities
that ordinarily would be subject to inquiry and to insulate
themselves from otherwise proper scrutiny.
67. Saltzburg, supra note 48, at 819.
68. Id.
69. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 14, § 2296 at 566; see C. MCCORMICK, supra note
6, 88 at 179-80; see also United States v. Davis, 636 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1981) (preparation of tax return); United States v. Bartone, 400 F.2d 459 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 1027 (1969) (services consisted of tracing funds); Pollock v. United States,
202 F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1953) (money deposited with attorney to be applied on purchase
of real estate); McFee v. United States, 206 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1953) (payment of fines
owed by client).
70. Saltzburg, supra note 48, at 823. The payment of release bonds for third persons would seem to qualify as an act which would be subject to scrutiny if performed
by a nonlawyer. Thus the mere fact that a lawyer is employed to post bonds to release
coconspirators should not justify permitting the lawyer to claim a privilege as to the
identity of the payor of the bonds. Perhaps a narrow ground upon which the courts
could require disclosure of the benefactor's identity in umbrella defense cases would
be to compel disclosure of the benefactor qua payor of release bonds. Disclosure of
the benefactor's identity in bond payment situations arguably would be compellable
without reference to the issue of privilege as to communications concerning third-party
representation. See In re Pavlick, 680 F.2d at 1030 (Garwood, J., concurring). But see
Ex parte McDonough, 170 Cal. 230, 149 P. 566 (1915), an umbrella defense case in which
the court found inter alia that the benefactor's employment of an attorney to bond
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Yet, as Wigmore points out, the distinction between the "legal"
and "nonlegal," or "agency," functions of an attorney may be unclear."
"Where the general purpose concerns legal rights and obligations, a
particular incidental transaction would receive protection, though in
itself it were merely commercial in nature."" Consider, for example,
Baird v. Koerner"3 and Tillotson v. Boughner," both cases involving
clients who contacted attorneys for advice as to unpaid taxes; the
attorneys were incidentally employed to make payments on behalf of
the clients into the United States Treasury. Both courts found communications relating to the latter employment (including client identity) to be privileged." Consider also the situation in which a client
possessed of incriminatory information seeks a lawyer for advice as
to his legal duty to disclose the information. The attorney agrees to
divulge the information to the appropriate authorities but to retain
the secrecy of the client's identity (the client normally fears redress
or personal inculpation). The courts have applied the communications
privilege to protect the client's identity in these situations."6 In NLRB
v. Harvey," the court stated,
We recognize, nevertheless, that circumstances may exist where
a lawyer finds it necessary to employ a detective to enable him
adequately to furnish legal services to his client. In such a situation the client's communication, including those to the hiring of
the detective, would be privileged because the legal services are
indistinguishable from the non-legal. 8
The above cases suggest that the courts must determine in each
case the degree to which the advisory and agency functions of an
attorney are intermingled or suffioiently "indistinguishable" so as to
suspects was a "communication" by the benefactor falling within the attorney-client
privilege between the benefactor and the attorney.
71. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 14, S 2296 at 566.
72. Id. at 567.
73. 279 F.2d 623, 626-27 (9th Cir. 1960).
74. 350 F.2d 663 (7th Cir. 1965).
75. 279 F.2d at 630-32; 350 F.2d at 666.
76. E.g., In re Kozlov, 79 N.J. 232, 398 A.2d 882 (1979), where the court specifically distinguished cases involving the "identity of the payor of a retainer fee (perhaps
only theoretically a 'client') for the professional defense of others accused of gambling
crimes." The court spoke of "the higher public interest and necessity motivating the
courts . . .(to require disclosure) .. .in such cases" involving the umbrella defense.
79 N.J. at 240, 398 A.2d at 886. See also In re Kaplan, 8 N.Y.2d 214, 168 N.E.2d 660,
203 N.Y.S.2d 836 (1960).
77. 349 F.2d 900 (4th Cir. 1965).
78. Id. at 906-07. The court further stated that "[in the absence of mingled legal
and non-legal services, no sound reason exists for courts to clothe in secrecy the identity of the person ordering the surveillance simply because a lawyer acted as his intermediary." Id. at 907.
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render appropriate the application of the privilege to both functions."
Although an attorney uses his legal skills in representing third parties, arguably such representation, or the payment of release bonds
for third parties, is neither "incidental" to nor "indistinguishable" from
personal legal representation of the communicating benefactor. With
reference to the benefactor, the attorney functions as an "agent" for
these purposes, and thus communications thereto should not fall within
the benefactor's privilege."
Conclusion
The use of the lawyer as "agent" rather than as "advisor" is at
the root of the umbrella defense problem. A strict, though reasonable,
construction of the scope of the privilege as between benefactor and
attorney avoids the above mentioned abuses, renders unnecessary the
discussion of the client identity privilege, and avoids the harsh results
of the application of the crime-fraud exception. The identity issue is
one of vital importance beyond the specific problem of the umbrella
defense. Should courts further narrow the client identity privilege for
the specific purpose of defeating umbrella operations, they may poorly
serve other unidentified clients (who are, beyond argument, "clients")
whose interests in nondisclosure are more meritorious.8 1
Restriction of the attorney-client privilege to communications concerning personal legal advice or assistance should not exclude from
the privilege services closely related or incidental thereto. However,
the privilege should not be broadly extended to shield from scrutiny
the use of an attorney for a variety of activities unrelated to advising or assisting the hirer concerning his own legal affairs. As illustrated by the use of an attorney in umbrella defense operations,
such an extension of the privilege may exact an unjustifiably high
social cost.
James A. Brown
79. In the tax payment and informer situations, the courts found a sufficiently
close relationship, even though a nonlawyer could have paid over the taxes or passed
on the information. In making the determination, the courts again should balance truth
versus privilege and apply the policy of "strictly confining" the privilege "within the
narrowest possible limits consistent with the logic of its principle." 8 J. WIGMORE,
supra note 14, § 2291 at 554.
80. In Baird, the court noted that a "factor" which would preclude extension of
the communications privilege to the protection of the identity of the client was "an
identification relating to an employment by some third person, not the client nor his
agent." 279 F.2d at 632. See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 14, § 2296 at 567.
81. See authorities collected at note 13, supra.

